Two Way Street

← The Home Fronts

Russian Mobilisation

There is still no new mobilisation order, and the contract system that replaced one is working harder for less. By Janis Kluge’s count from regional budget data, 263,000 men signed contracts from January to September, against 292,000 a year earlier — a pace that would miss the 2026 target of 409,000. The average regional sign-up bonus has risen 30% in a year, to 1.9m roubles. Relatives describe men pressed into contracts by recruiters working to quotas; Kluge calls it coercive mobilisation by delegation, while Carnegie’s Dara Massicot judges the supply still sufficient.

The autumn draft will take about 120,000 conscripts, down from 135,000 a year ago, and it is the routine one-year call, not a mobilisation. Bills to raise women’s service age and to call reservists into the fire service are in preparation, not law.

The losses being replaced keep rising. BBC Russian and Mediazona have now named 281,753 Russian dead, and the BBC estimates the real toll at 512,000 to 626,000. An unnamed NATO official put September’s Russian casualties above 50,000.

New

3

The whole story5 chapters
The state of it — as of October 17, 2026
281,753
Russian soldiers confirmed dead by name — a floor, not a total (Mediazona)
2,441,630
authorised strength of Russia’s armed forces after the fourth increase this year
None
mobilisation orders issued since September’s Duma election

Today

The Named Russian Dead Pass 280,000, and the BBC Puts the Real Toll Above Half a Million

BBC Russian, Mediazona and volunteers have now confirmed by name 281,753 Russian military dead of the full-scale invasion, up from 239,354 in mid-August. Volunteers who signed contracts after the invasion are about 35% of them; prisoners about 10%, half their 2023 share; mobilised men about 8%. The count is a floor. The BBC estimates the true toll at 512,278 to 626,118, on military experts’ view that open sources capture 45–55% of deaths. Separately, an unnamed senior NATO official told Bloomberg that Russia lost more than 50,000 men killed and wounded in September, up to 28,000 of them killed — an allied estimate, not a count.

Read

BBC Newsbbc.com95% credibility · not yet testedAn opening estimate from its institutional history — none of its claims checked yet.Ukrinformukrinform.net60% credibility · not yet testedAn opening estimate from its institutional history — none of its claims checked yet.Militarnyimilitarnyi.com85% credibility · not yet testedAn opening estimate from its institutional history — none of its claims checked yet.

Recruiting Runs Behind Last Year, the Bonuses Climb, and the Net Widens

Contract recruitment is slipping. By Janis Kluge’s count from regional budget data, 29,900 men signed in September against 31,900 a year earlier, and 263,000 from January to September against 292,000 — a pace that would miss the 409,000 target for 2026. The average regional sign-up bonus has risen 30% in a year, to 1.9m roubles, though St Petersburg has just cut its own. Irkutsk now pays intermediaries 1.5m roubles for each foreigner recruited. Relatives describe men pressed into contracts, among them a 63-year-old Penza pastry chef seized during the Duma vote. ‘Coercive mobilization is already happening,’ Kluge says; Carnegie’s Dara Massicot judges the supply still ‘sufficient’, with no 2022-style deficit.

Read

Radio Free Europe/Radio Libertyrferl.org85% credibility · not yet testedAn opening estimate from its institutional history — none of its claims checked yet.Conflict Intelligence Team (CIT)notes.citeam.org75% credibility · not yet testedAn opening estimate from its institutional history — none of its claims checked yet.

Earlier this month

6
New

A Smaller Autumn Draft, and Three Drafts of Law That Widen Who Can Be Called

Russia’s autumn conscription will send about 120,000 men into service between October and December, down from 135,000 in autumn 2025 and 141,000 in spring 2026; units began receiving them on October 10. It is the routine one-year draft, not a mobilisation, and the General Staff’s mobilisation chief said conscripts would not be sent to fight in Ukraine — an assurance Moscow also gave in 2022. Three measures were in preparation by mid-October, none yet adopted: a government bill raising the maximum service age for women from 45 to 50, an Emergencies Ministry draft to call reservists into the fire service, and a Defence Ministry draft decree giving military police new powers to hunt deserters.

Read

The Kyiv Independentkyivindependent.com85% credibility · not yet testedAn opening estimate from its institutional history — none of its claims checked yet.Conflict Intelligence Team (CIT)notes.citeam.org75% credibility · not yet testedAn opening estimate from its institutional history — none of its claims checked yet.Radio Free Europe/Radio Libertyrferl.org85% credibility · not yet testedAn opening estimate from its institutional history — none of its claims checked yet.
Russian forces suffered 46,320 casualties in September 2026.

— General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine

Not yet checked

Unverified — a belligerent’s count of its enemy’s losses, with no independent access to check it. ISW relays it as the third month running above 40,000 and the highest of 2026, and gives no recruitment figure for the month to set against it.

Read

Institute for the Study of Warunderstandingwar.org95% credibility · not yet testedAn opening estimate from its institutional history — none of its claims checked yet.

A Fourth Decree Enlarges the Army on Paper. No Call-Up Has Followed the Vote

Putin signed a decree on September 28 raising the authorised strength of the armed forces to 2,441,630, including 1,550,500 servicemen — about 15,500 more than in July and the fourth increase this year. It is not a mobilisation order, and by October 9 none had followed the election, Jamestown found. Contract recruitment has been falling since 2025, and ISW judges it replaces fewer soldiers than Russia loses; rights groups received reports of men coerced into contracts from at least 17 regions. ISW wrote on October 8 that commanders are ‘reportedly pressing Putin for a massive mobilization’, citing no source.

Read

Euronewseuronews.com85% credibility · not yet testedAn opening estimate from its institutional history — none of its claims checked yet.The Kyiv Independentkyivindependent.com85% credibility · not yet testedAn opening estimate from its institutional history — none of its claims checked yet.The Jamestown Foundationjamestown.org72% credibility · not yet testedAn opening estimate from its institutional history — none of its claims checked yet.Institute for the Study of Warunderstandingwar.org95% credibility · not yet testedAn opening estimate from its institutional history — none of its claims checked yet.Institute for the Study of Warunderstandingwar.org95% credibility · not yet testedAn opening estimate from its institutional history — none of its claims checked yet.
In essence, Russia has already begun additional mobilisation, it is expanding the scale of recruitment to its ranks, using various methods for this.

— Volodymyr Zelenskyy

Not yet checked

Unverified — a characterisation, not a dated forecast. Putin’s decree of the same day raised authorised strength by about 15,500; no mobilisation order had issued by 9 October (Jamestown). Whether expanded recruitment amounts to “mobilisation” is the claim itself, and no recruitment figures accompanied it.

Read

The Kyiv Independentkyivindependent.com85% credibility · not yet testedAn opening estimate from its institutional history — none of its claims checked yet.Euronewseuronews.com85% credibility · not yet testedAn opening estimate from its institutional history — none of its claims checked yet.The Jamestown Foundationjamestown.org72% credibility · not yet testedAn opening estimate from its institutional history — none of its claims checked yet.

Leaving Before the Polls Close

Requests for emergency emigration help from Russia have risen nearly eightfold since the start of summer, according to the anti-war project Ark, whose own tally shows daily requests up from about 70 to about 120 since July. Searches for ‘how to leave’ and ‘mobilisation’ reached their highest level since early 2023 over the summer and the first ten days of September. Tens of thousands have received mobilisation notices, and an electronic summons register now imposes an automatic exit ban the moment a notice is issued. In early September a 24-year-old who finished his service in 2024 was stopped at Krasnodar and served with one — the first such case reported at that crossing. None of this is a mobilisation decision. It is the machinery for one, and the behaviour of people who expect it.

Read

Euronewseuronews.com85% credibility · not yet testedAn opening estimate from its institutional history — none of its claims checked yet.The Guardiantheguardian.com90% credibility · not yet testedAn opening estimate from its institutional history — none of its claims checked yet.
Talk of a new Russian mobilisation is ‘utter nonsense’.

— Vladimir Putin

Not yet checked

Independent Russian media count 17 official denials of an imminent draft since the summer. Not tagged as a prediction: the phrase names no date and no bounded observable. What will score it is the accumulating record of denials against any eventual call-up, and the election closes on September 20.

Read

Euronewseuronews.com85% credibility · not yet testedAn opening estimate from its institutional history — none of its claims checked yet.The Guardiantheguardian.com90% credibility · not yet testedAn opening estimate from its institutional history — none of its claims checked yet.

This quarter

13

Russia Turns to the Medically Unfit to Guard Its Own Rear

Putin said on 5 September he backs letting volunteers graded category D — unfit for military service — join regional air defence formations such as the BARS reserve to protect Russian facilities from Ukrainian drones, and that air defence needs a single commander rather than a coordinating body. It follows measures pushing the job outward: private companies have had to fund air defences at their own sites since late May, and Putin's 24 August decree lets the state seize critical infrastructure whose owners fail to protect it — not nationalisation, he said, but a way to force air defences in.

Read

Institute for the Study of Warunderstandingwar.org95% credibility · not yet testedAn opening estimate from its institutional history — none of its claims checked yet.Institute for the Study of Warunderstandingwar.org95% credibility · not yet testedAn opening estimate from its institutional history — none of its claims checked yet.
There is no scenario today that would require mobilization. This is an information attack by the enemy ahead of the State Duma elections in an attempt to influence the result. This is simply a planned information operation.

— Vladimir Putin

Read

Interfaxinterfax.ru60% credibility · not yet testedAn opening estimate from its institutional history — none of its claims checked yet.Kyiv Postkyivpost.com85% credibility · not yet testedAn opening estimate from its institutional history — none of its claims checked yet.The Moscow Timesthemoscowtimes.com85% credibility · not yet testedAn opening estimate from its institutional history — none of its claims checked yet.Meduzameduza.io85% credibility · not yet testedAn opening estimate from its institutional history — none of its claims checked yet.The Guardiantheguardian.com90% credibility · not yet testedAn opening estimate from its institutional history — none of its claims checked yet.

The Machinery for a Call-Up Keeps Being Built; the Recruiters Are Still Making Their Numbers

Two readings of Russia's manpower position now sit side by side. The legal machinery a call-up would run on keeps being built: on July 22 the Duma widened which people with criminal convictions may sign military contracts during mobilisation, martial law or wartime, and on August 20 the government tabled a bill fining companies up to 1 million roubles, or suspending them 90 days, for defying a governor or an operational headquarters on mobilisation matters. Against that, Janis Kluge of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, reading regional budget data, counts about 93,000 contracts signed in the second quarter — roughly a thousand a day, stabilising after a decline since late 2024, at an average regional cost up 30 percent in a year to 1.8-1.9 million roubles. He reads that as easing the pressure for a call-up; CEPA, surveying the preparations on September 3, calls his a minority view. Searches for “exemption from mobilisation” on Yandex reached 97,380 in July, the second-highest since September 2022.

Read

Interfaxinterfax.ru60% credibility · not yet testedAn opening estimate from its institutional history — none of its claims checked yet.Interfaxinterfax.ru60% credibility · not yet testedAn opening estimate from its institutional history — none of its claims checked yet.Substack (self-published newsletter)substack.com50% credibility · not yet testedAn opening estimate from its institutional history — none of its claims checked yet.Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA)cepa.org85% credibility · not yet testedAn opening estimate from its institutional history — none of its claims checked yet.

This Time They Are Leaving Before the Decree

Russians of call-up age have begun leaving the country in advance of any mobilisation announcement — the reverse of 2022, when departures followed the decree. Russia's own Federal Customs Service data, cited by The Moscow Times, show more than 19,000 people a day crossing into Georgia at Verkhny Lars on 15 and 16 August and more than 20,000 on 18 August; Politico put the week's total at about 113,000. The rights group School of the Conscript reports a rise in requests for help, mostly from reservists, and says authorities have been gathering reservists' data through employers and tracing relatives' addresses, with men summoned to enlistment offices and issued orders naming the unit they would report to. Its director Alexey Tabalov describes the groundwork for a call-up that need never be declared: "It's enough to send, say, 10 buses to a particular metallurgical plant and pick up a predetermined number of specific people straight from their workplaces."

Read

NV (Novoye Vremya)english.nv.ua80% credibility · not yet testedAn opening estimate from its institutional history — none of its claims checked yet.
The Russian General Staff has prepared a scenario for the additional mobilisation of 600,000 people across 2026 and 2027 — 300,000 in each year — chiefly to bring units fighting Ukraine up to strength; Putin will most likely decide after the 18–20 September State Duma elections.

— Main Directorate of Intelligence of Ukraine's Ministry of Defence (HUR)

Read

Ukrainska Pravdapravda.com.ua80% credibility · not yet testedAn opening estimate from its institutional history — none of its claims checked yet.
The Kremlin is preparing to mobilise around 300,000 servicemembers after the September 18–20 State Duma elections, in part to reinforce Russian positions in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.

— Volodymyr Zelenskyy

Read

Institute for the Study of Warunderstandingwar.org95% credibility · not yet testedAn opening estimate from its institutional history — none of its claims checked yet.The Jamestown Foundationjamestown.org72% credibility · not yet testedAn opening estimate from its institutional history — none of its claims checked yet.Euronewseuronews.com85% credibility · not yet testedAn opening estimate from its institutional history — none of its claims checked yet.
Russian forces have suffered around 267,000 personnel casualties along the entire frontline since the beginning of 2026, including about 155,000 killed, and roughly 70 to 80 percent of all Russian losses occur in the Kostiantynivka direction.

— Volodymyr Zelenskyy

Read

Institute for the Study of Warunderstandingwar.org95% credibility · not yet testedAn opening estimate from its institutional history — none of its claims checked yet.
Russia could ask North Korea to provide up to 50,000 additional troops during a potential September meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un.

— Vadym Skibitskyi

Read

Kyiv Postkyivpost.com85% credibility · not yet testedAn opening estimate from its institutional history — none of its claims checked yet.Ukrainska Pravdapravda.com.ua80% credibility · not yet testedAn opening estimate from its institutional history — none of its claims checked yet.

The Confirmed Russian Death Toll Passes 239,000 — and Falls Further Behind the War

Mediazona, working with the BBC Russian service and a team of volunteers, has now confirmed by name 239,354 Russian military personnel killed between February 24, 2022 and August 13, 2026. The list is built only from publicly verifiable material — obituaries, relatives' social-media posts, local media, and statements by regional authorities — and its compilers stress it is not exhaustive, because not every death is publicly reported. Among those identified are 87,749 volunteers who signed contracts after the invasion began, 26,416 recruited prisoners, 19,778 mobilised men and 7,533 officers; volunteers have been the largest single category of the dead since September 2024, and the officer share of fatalities has fallen from around 10% early in the war to between 2% and 3%. A date of death is known in 221,500 cases, about 93% of the total. The more consequential finding is how far the count now lags the fighting. Of more than 77,000 deaths confirmed since the start of 2026, no more than a tenth occurred in 2026; the rest died between 2022 and 2025. Mediazona attributes the widening delay to the shape of the current war rather than to any slowdown in losses: the drone-controlled "grey zone" between the armies now runs for tens of kilometres and bodies frequently cannot be recovered from it, small-group infiltration tactics leave the dead where they fall until the front moves twelve to twenty kilometres beyond them, and in 2026 the front has barely moved at all. Without a body or a court ruling declaring a missing man dead there is no death certificate, and therefore no obituary to find. The team adds 5,000 to 6,000 unique records a month in normal conditions, and has taken to cross-checking leaked unit rosters and missing-persons appeals to close the gap. Separately, it maintains an excess-mortality estimate built with Meduza from the national Probate Registry, last updated on May 9, 2026 and covering deaths only to late December 2025. The figure is therefore a floor on Russian deaths, not a measure of them, and by construction it is least complete for the months that matter most to the question of whether Russia can replace its losses. Claimed totals are far higher and are not comparable: Ukraine's General Staff put cumulative Russian personnel losses at about 1,467,320 as of August 17 without separating the killed from the wounded, missing and captured, and on July 31 Volodymyr Zelensky put Russian casualties at roughly 1.6 million including some 700,000 killed.

Read

Mediazonaen.zona.media80% credibility · not yet testedAn opening estimate from its institutional history — none of its claims checked yet.The Kyiv Independentkyivindependent.com85% credibility · not yet testedAn opening estimate from its institutional history — none of its claims checked yet.
Putin's plan is not particularly complicated… after the so-called elections, he plans an additional rapid mobilization of several hundred thousand Russians by the end of the year, plus the same number for the year after.

— Volodymyr Zelenskyy

Read

The Kyiv Independentkyivindependent.com85% credibility · not yet testedAn opening estimate from its institutional history — none of its claims checked yet.Kyiv Postkyivpost.com85% credibility · not yet testedAn opening estimate from its institutional history — none of its claims checked yet.
Attempts by the enemy to spout all sorts of drivel about mobilisation being prepared in the country are nothing more than a lying provocation. It is part of the propaganda ahead of the elections. They are trying, naturally, to destabilise the situation.

— Dmitry Medvedev Mixed

Read

Meduzameduza.io85% credibility · not yet testedAn opening estimate from its institutional history — none of its claims checked yet.Institute for the Study of Warunderstandingwar.org95% credibility · not yet testedAn opening estimate from its institutional history — none of its claims checked yet.EUobservereuobserver.com72% credibility · not yet testedAn opening estimate from its institutional history — none of its claims checked yet.United24 Mediaunited24media.com80% credibility · not yet testedAn opening estimate from its institutional history — none of its claims checked yet.Militarnyimilitarnyi.com85% credibility · not yet testedAn opening estimate from its institutional history — none of its claims checked yet.Substack (self-published newsletter)substack.com50% credibility · not yet testedAn opening estimate from its institutional history — none of its claims checked yet.
We have clear intelligence that Russia is preparing a new and quite significant wave of mobilization for the fall. Currently, the Russians are losing more troops on the front than they are recruiting.

— Volodymyr Zelenskyy

Read

The Kyiv Independentkyivindependent.com85% credibility · not yet testedAn opening estimate from its institutional history — none of its claims checked yet.The Kyiv Independentkyivindependent.com85% credibility · not yet testedAn opening estimate from its institutional history — none of its claims checked yet.Institute for the Study of Warunderstandingwar.org95% credibility · not yet testedAn opening estimate from its institutional history — none of its claims checked yet.Institute for the Study of Warunderstandingwar.org95% credibility · not yet testedAn opening estimate from its institutional history — none of its claims checked yet.Meduzameduza.io85% credibility · not yet testedAn opening estimate from its institutional history — none of its claims checked yet.EUobservereuobserver.com72% credibility · not yet testedAn opening estimate from its institutional history — none of its claims checked yet.Institute for the Study of Warunderstandingwar.org95% credibility · not yet testedAn opening estimate from its institutional history — none of its claims checked yet.The Jamestown Foundationjamestown.org72% credibility · not yet testedAn opening estimate from its institutional history — none of its claims checked yet.Euronewseuronews.com85% credibility · not yet testedAn opening estimate from its institutional history — none of its claims checked yet.
I think it's the only conflict — I've been told it's the only conflict that anyone in the military can recall where the killed-in-action rate is higher than the casualty rate. That's how bloody it is. The Russians, I believe, are losing upwards of five to six thousand soldiers a week. That's a staggering number.

— Marco Rubio

Rubio's own hedges are load-bearing: he attributes the killed-exceeds-wounded proposition to hearsay — "I've been told" — and the weekly figure to his own belief ("I believe", "upwards of"). The nearest independent comparison available, from CSIS, puts Russian losses at 400,000–450,000 killed within 1.4 million total casualties since February 2022 — killed at roughly 30 per cent of casualties cumulatively, which sits against his framing unless he meant only the present rate — and the Russian-to-Ukrainian casualty ratio at about eight to one in the first half of 2026. Worth comparing in its own right: the version of this remark that circulated in quotation marks — "That's how bloody this war is. The Russians, I believe, are losing more than 5,000-6,000 soldiers a week. That is a shocking amount." — appears in that form in Kyiv Post, United24 Media and elsewhere, all tracing to one Guardian live blog. Set against the State Department transcript linked here, it is reordered, "upwards of" has become "more than", "staggering number" has become "shocking amount", and "I've been told" has been dropped entirely. Both documents are cited so the two can be read side by side.

Read

United States Department of Statestate.gov85% credibility · not yet testedAn opening estimate from its institutional history — none of its claims checked yet.Kyiv Postkyivpost.com85% credibility · not yet testedAn opening estimate from its institutional history — none of its claims checked yet.United24 Mediaunited24media.com80% credibility · not yet testedAn opening estimate from its institutional history — none of its claims checked yet.
Covered since Jul 2026Read it from the start →