Volodymyr Zelenskyy

Context: A belligerent's count of the other side's dead, carried by ISW without endorsement. No independent verification exists for either army's casualty figures, and the nearest independent series — Mediazona's confirmed-death count — is built on a much narrower basis and is not comparable. The 70–80 percent concentration on one axis is the more checkable half and would be the more consequential if true.

Context: Newly recorded; resolves 2026-12-31. A Ukrainian head of state's intelligence claim about Russian intentions — recorded as a voice, not as established fact. Russia has announced one partial mobilisation since 2022 and has since relied on contract recruitment; ISW carries the claim without endorsing it.

Context: Newly recorded; resolves on 2027-09-30. "End of this year" is read as from 1 November 2026 and "end of summer 2027" as 30 September 2027. Said at the National Flag Day ceremony in Kyiv, with the two sides still divided over Ukrainian withdrawal from Donbas.

Context: A quantified plea, not a settled fact. The 5%/10% sufficiency figures can't be tested — the condition won't be met; the '2.5x fewer interceptors, 2x more Russian ballistic missiles' ratios are Kyiv's own but align with independent reporting that Russian ballistic launches more than tripled April–July 2026. In response a White House official said the US was only 'exploring' pathways and had decided nothing. July was the deadliest month for Ukrainian civilians since April 2022, per the UN.

Context: Unverified — a Ukrainian-intelligence warning whose internal-documents basis cannot be independently checked, and no mobilisation decree has issued. It sharpens the dated test already on this timeline: the July 24 prediction resolves on a published decree by November 30, after the September 18-20 Duma elections. Russia has ordered only one 'partial mobilisation' in the war, in September 2022, which triggered protests and an exodus.

Context: Unverified, and contested within two days. Zelenskyy said it in his August 11 evening address and told CNN the next day that new proposals had been prepared, disclosing their contents neither time. On August 13 a US official told the Kyiv Independent that Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner "haven’t seen it yet." The two accounts may not describe the same document — Kyiv has spoken of both a set of proposals and a separate plan to pressure Moscow — and no published account reconciles them.

Context: Mixed, and contradicted on its core claim. On 12 August a White House official told CNN the US was only 'exploring several potential pathways' for defence-industrial cooperation, with 'no specific … initiatives … decided upon or guaranteed'; Politico reported the same. Contacts with Lockheed and RTX are real, but the categorical 'the decision has been made' did not hold up — Washington says nothing is decided. It echoes Zelenskyy's 28 July 'Trump accepted' claim, reversed on 31 July.

Context: Mixed. The deliveries are real; the attribution is not. Ukraine's Defence Ministry states that about 95% of the Patriot interceptors reaching Ukraine arrive through NATO's PURL mechanism, in which allied governments pay for weapons drawn from US stocks — $6.7bn from 29 countries in its first year. So a monthly flow exists and is smaller than 2025's, but it is bought by Europe rather than supplied by Washington.

Context: Unverified — a claim by a party to the conflict, recorded as its account. Zelenskyy said it on 5 August, the morning after a Kyiv barrage Ukraine intercepted none of. Ukraine publishes no interceptor-arrival figures, so the threefold fall cannot be independently checked; it is directionally consistent with Kyiv's own figures of roughly 60–65 interceptors produced monthly against about 120 Russian ballistic missiles.

Context: Unverified as to outcome; the ask is on the record. Zelenskyy told Axios on 29 July he had requested 300 interceptors as an emergency winter package and warned a production licence would take one to five years to yield meaningful numbers — 'We need the Patriots yesterday.' The Financial Times reported Trump then refused the request on US-stockpile grounds.

Context: Mixed. Zelenskyy faithfully relayed an assurance that existed — he said it to Fox News after the 28 July Oval Office meeting — but the counterpart reversed it three days later, Trump saying on 31 July 'We have not agreed to that.' A true report of a private undertaking that was then retracted, and that never produced a licence or a contract.

Context: Unverified — the horizon has not passed. "The fall" is read as on or before November 30, 2026, the most charitable concrete reading of an undated horizon, and that reading is what fixes this prediction's resolveBy. No mobilisation decree has been issued; the July 27 decree raising authorised end strength to 2,426,130 is a different instrument and does not resolve it. ISW assesses Putin would likely wait until after the mid-September Duma elections.

Context: Unverified — the horizon has not passed. Recorded as a prediction with an autumn 2026 resolve-by. ISW relays the statement in paraphrase, sourced to Suspilne, so the claim is stated rather than quoted verbatim; 'autumn 2026' is read as on or before November 30, 2026. Context at capture: the Kremlin reasserted its June 2024 maximalist demands the previous day, and the US and Russia published incompatible accounts of the July 23 Rubio–Lavrov meeting, and the trilateral format the claim looks forward to had by then lapsed rather than never existed. Three rounds with delegations from all three governments were held earlier in 2026: Abu Dhabi on January 23-24, which the BBC described as the first meeting attended by all three countries since the full-scale invasion; Abu Dhabi again on February 4-5; and Geneva on February 18, reported by Anadolu Agency as the third round, with Rustem Umerov leading for Ukraine, Vladimir Medinsky for Russia, and Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner mediating. Serhii Kyslytsia, first deputy head of the Office of the President, gave the same sequence in a July 9 interview — two meetings in Abu Dhabi and one full trilateral meeting in Geneva — and said what distinguished 2026 was that talks had reached the format of full trilateral meetings. Nothing has convened since February 18, five months before the claim was made, which is the sense in which the format was dormant. This bears on how the prediction is scored. Read literally its metric has no lower bound, so those pre-claim rounds would satisfy it, which cannot be what a forward-looking claim meant; the metric is immutable once recorded and is not being edited, so the cycle that resolves this must count only sessions convening after July 23, 2026, and must record that it did so.

Context: Unverified — a forward-looking claim, recorded as a prediction running to July 2028. No contract, licence, value or date has been published by either company or by the US government, and Raytheon's own president of land and air defence systems said at Farnborough on 20 July that the licensing process 'has just started'. Trump's 31 July withdrawal of the enabling licence pledge makes the affirmative outcome materially less likely without resolving it.

Context: Unverified. Zelenskyy's characterization of a 'toxic atmosphere' inside Putin's inner circle and of aides distancing themselves from Putin cannot be independently confirmed from open sources; it is an assertion about private Russian elite sentiment. It is in direct tension with the Kremlin's own conduct the same week: Bloomberg reported on July 22 that Moscow had hardened its territorial demands — no longer offering to return occupied parts of Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts — and Putin remained set on taking all of Donetsk by force before any talks, behavior that signals confidence rather than a leader under internal pressure. Two further data points this cycle cut the same way without settling it: on July 22 Putin chaired a meeting on the economy and asserted it 'remains stable despite external attempts to destabilise the fuel and energy sector', and Peskov restated the June 2024 maximalist demands as Russia's terms — public conduct consistent with confidence rather than isolation. Set against that, independent indicators of strain accumulated in the same week (the Moscow Exchange's largest single-day fall since September 2022 on July 16; a 7.9% rise in the minimum food basket since January; over 81% of gasoline purchase requests unfulfilled), and Ukrainian strikes reached the consumer economy for the first time. None of that is evidence about the sentiment of Putin's retinue, which is what the claim asserts and what remains unobservable. Stays unverified.

Context: True. The statement accurately reflects Zelenskyy's rationale for intervening in the dispute between the Defense Ministry and the armed forces command.

Context: Zelenskyy's account, given at the Munich Security Conference per The Guardian; the 20-year demand and the 15-year US offer are his disclosure of closed negotiations and have not been independently confirmed. Consistent with December 2025 reporting that guarantees would initially run 10 years extendable (Ukrainska Pravda).

Context: True. Zelenskyy announced the one-million-drone production goal on Dec 19, 2023 (Reuters), marking a major shift toward asymmetrical drone warfare to compensate for artillery shortages. (The 'FPV' specification came from Digital Minister Mykhailo Fedorov the following day and was removed from this quote as it was not part of Zelenskyy's statement.)

Context: True. Zelenskyy remained in Kyiv throughout the initial siege.